<The Odido data breach>
The data breach at Odido is causing unrest in many organizations. Not because they are customers. But because they see one thing: If it goes wrong there, can it happen to us too?
A fair question. So here's the facts, the cause and especially what you can already test in your own organization today.
<What actually happened>
On the weekend of February 7–8, 2026, criminals gained access to Odido's internal systems. The entrance was not a zero-day or super hack. It started with social engineering (Social engineering is when someone fools you into opening the door that should have stayed closed.) on employees of external call centers. People were misled and gave away information or access.
After that, the attackers were able to copy customer data from a total of about 6–6.2 million accounts. According to some external sources, the hackers even claimed 10 million accounts.
Odido then decided not to pay a ransom, after which the group published all data, first on the dark web and later on the open internet.
That is the core. The breakthrough came through people, not technology.
<Why this makes>
The leak shows how big the impact is if one link breaks. Not because of a direct IT vulnerability, but because of human factors in the chain. As a result, companies see three insights:
A. You are only as strong as the weakest supplier: In this case: external call centers. Many organizations also have service partners, IT partners, back offices, HR processors, cloud vendors, etc.
B. Social engineering still works painfully well: Odido is a big player with mature security and yet it works through people. That triggers the question: how resilient are our own teams?
C. The scale of the leak shows that data collection increases risks: The more data you store, the greater the impact of one mistake or deception.
<What can you do or test>
This is not about the misuse of Odido data.This is about: can this also happen to us?
Here are the practical checks you can do today.
<Test your human resistance>
Run a social engineering simulation
Not only phishing, but also:
The Odido incident started the same way: by decepting people.
Set the bar simply: one question: "Can you seduce someone into access or information that you are not allowed to have?"
If the answer is (probably) yes, you immediately have areas for improvement.
<Check your>
Ask yourself three questions:
The attack at Odido started with an external party. Not with their own network. That makes this part extra important.
<Take an>
Look at who has access to:
Ask just one question: "What can someone in our organization do with too much access if they are misled?"
This is exactly where it went wrong with Odido: too wide access through human entrances.
<Recheck your internal>
Many processes rely on "information that only we know". But in the Odido case, that information ended up in the hands of criminals.
That means: If your organization relies on personal data as verification, that's a vulnerability.
Test this by:
<Test your>
Prepare a realistic scenario test: "An attacker has gained access to an employee account through social engineering. How long will it take before we notice this?"
This is where many organizations are shocked:
A simple tablet exercise shows this immediately.
<The most>
The Odido data leak is not a technical story. It is a people process story.
And with that, a wakeup call that does help:
Now is the time to compare your own organization to what went wrong at Odido not to judge, but to learn.
<Do you want to know how>
Let's do a baseline assessment. No thick reports, no assumptions, just a clear scan of your people, your processes and your chain.
You will know within a short time:
Do you want to be sure? We help you test reality.
Call 072 202 97 95 or email info@brandaris.it. We would like to plan an introduction in Alkmaar, with coffee. Prefer digital? Fill in the contact form and we will contact you.
<cybersecurity consultant>